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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Nat P. Ozman*
A Motorist, Arrested for Drunken Driving, Is Incapable of Entering a Plea
of Guilty While Still Intoxicated-A motorist was convicted of drunken driving. The Supreme Court of Indiana held that the evidence sustained the conviction. McClaahan v. State, 112 N.E.2d 575 (Ind. 1953). However, the
case asserts that the defendant motorist cannot make a valid plea of guilty
while he is intoxicated since his mental condition is such that he cannot freely
and understandingly realize the nature of his action.
It is also interesting to note two further points in this case. First, a motorist, who is arrested for drunken driving should not be released from custody
while intoxicated, since his release would permit him to commit another misdemeanor by being found in a public place while intoxicated. Secondly, it
is not necessary that the drunken person be taken immediately before a magistrate as required by statute, and therefore testimony as to what occurred
while he was held in the police station is admissible.
Blood Test Admissible in Manslaughter Case To Prove Intoxication-In
People v. Haeussler, 260 P.2d 8 (Calif. 1953), the defendant was convicted
of manslaughter and of driving a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor. While the defendant was unconscious after an automobile
collision an attendant at the hospital withdrew five cubic centimeters of blood;
four of which were used to type her blood for a transfusion and one of which
was tested for alcoholic content. The defendant contended that the admission
into evidence of the results of the blood test deprived her of due process of
law. The majority of the court held that the privilege against self incrimination was not involved since the privilege is directed against testimonial compulsion and evidence from a blood test is not such a communication from the
accused. Therefore the evidence was admissible, and the conviction affirmed.
Two justices dissented on the ground that the admission of this testimony did
constitute a denial of due process. They reasoned that the force used in obtaining the blood specimen, although not as shocking as that present in the
case of People v. Rochin, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (use of the stomach pump to
obtain evidence), was still force upon the body of a person while in an unconscious state and therefore within the ruling of the Rochim case.
No Violation of Self-Incrimination Privilege Where Defense Witness Is Cross
Examined About Defendant's Refusal To Submit To Truth-Serum Test-The
petitioner sought a writ of habeus corpus after conviction of first degree
murder in the state trial court. During the trial the defense introduced into
evidence certain hospital records which contained a statement by an examining psychiatrist that the defendant had refused to submit to sodium amytol
treatment. The prosecution cross-examined the psychiatrist and brought out
this statement. The federal district court denied the petition for the writ.
Draper v. Denno, 113 F. Supp. 290 (1953). The court reasoned that there
could not be a claim of denial of due process predicated upon the failure of
the defendant to object to the cross-examination and summation. The court
seemed to give considerable weight to the fact that the defense initially
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introduced the evidence and hinted that a different result might follow in a
case where the records were introduced by the prosecution. Also see Smith v.
Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
Results of Drunkometer Test Taken By Force Is Admissible In EvidencePolice officers arrested the defendant since they believed that he was operating
his automobile while intoxicated. The defendant refused to permit a specimen
of his breath to be taken for drunkometer test, but he was compelled to
submit. The constitutionality of such police action was certified to the Arizona
Supreme Court for an advisory opinion. The stipulated facts showed that
certain police officers would testify that in order to procure the breath specimen it was necessary to place the defendant in restraining straps. The
Supreme Court advised that the results of the drunkometer test were admissible in evidence even though the specimen was forcibly taken if the force
was used in capturing only exhaled breath. The police officers had a lawful
right to capture the accused's breath after it left his body if they made no
invasion of his person and if they used means which only "slightly" and
"temporarily" interfered with his freedom of action. The defendant under
these circumstances had no right to obstruct the efforts of the police, and if he
did so, they had a right to use such force as was reasonably necessary to overcome his interference. Thus the court held that the forcible taking was not
a violation of the constitutional privilege against self incrimination as this
privilege is directed primarily against testimonial compulsion. State v. Berg,
259 P.2d 261 (Ariz. 1953). Further, the court states that this case is distinguishable from Rochin v. California,342 U.S. 165 (1952) (invading the body
by a stomach pump), and therefore there is no violation of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Admission of Policeman's Notes Not Read or Signed by the Murder Defendant Is Reversible Error-The defendant was convicted of murder. On appeal
one of his allegations was that the court had erred in admitting into evidence
unsigned, unacknowledged notes taken by a police officer from a conversation
with him. The court held that this was reversible error. State v. Cooper, 10
N.J. 532 (1952). The defendant had been taken into police headquarters and
interrogated by a patrolman who took notes on some of the things that the
defendant said. The defendant, however, did not see the memorandum or
acknowledge or sign it. In fact he was not even conscious of its existence. This
memorandum was admitted into evidence although the trial court stated it was
only for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether the officer or the defendant first mentioned the names contained in it. The New Jersey Supreme Court
stated that when such a statement is not acknowledged by the defendant the
oral testimony of the witnesses, and not the transcript, is the only admissible
evidence. If this were not so, the oral testimony would not be given the
weight it should properly have. The court held that the admission of this
memorandum into evidence was prejudicial to the rights of the defendant and,
therefore, reversible error.

